This essay links some of my own work on expectations, learning and bounded rationality to the inspiring ideas of Jean-Michel Grandmont. In particular, my work on consistent expectations and behavioral learning equilibria may be seen as formalizations of JMG's ideas of self-fulfilling mistakes. Some of our learning-to-forecast laboratory experiments with human subjects have also been strongly influenced by JMG's ideas. Key features of self-fulfilling mistakes are multiple equilibria, excess volatility and persistence amplification.
Contents
1 Introduction
The ideas of Jean-Michel Grandmont have inspired the work of many young scholars in economics. During my own PhD thesis work on chaos in economic models (Hommes, 1991) , I have for example been studying his seminal contribution on chaos in overlapping generations models (Grandmont, 1985) . For many years thereafter, another seminal contribution Grandmont (1998) 1 on expectations formation and stability in large socio-economic systems has provided inspiration for my work on expectations, learning and bounded rationality in the last two decades (see e.g., .
Let me start off by quoting JMG at length (Grandmont, 1998 , pp.776-777):
Complex "learning equilibria" may be at first sight good candidates to explain why agents keep making significant and recurrent mistakes when trying to predict the fate of socioeconomic systems in which they participate. To be acceptable, however, the observed patterns along such "learning equilibria" should display some reasonable degree of consistency with the agents' beliefs. One might envision situations in which agents do believe (wrongly) that the world is relatively simple (e.g. linear) but subject to random shocks, and in which the corresponding (deterministic) "learning equilibria" are complex enough to make the agents' forecasting mistakes "self-fulfilling" in a well defined sense. For instance, the agents might be assumed to have at their disposal a reasonably wide, but nevertheless limited, battery of statistical tests ("bounded rationality") which would not allow them to reject the hypothesis that their recurrent forecasting mistakes are attributable to random disturbances ... It is not quite clear to me at this stage whether such a program can actually generate operational results or is even feasible (for a first step, see Sorger (1997) , Hommes and Sorger (1997) 2 ).
Yet progress on this front, if possible, might provide an interesting alternative to our current paradigms, which rely very heavily on extreme, and often criticized, rationality axioms.
This essay summarizes some of my work emphasizing how it has been follow- 1 An essential part of this work was already presented at JMG's Presidential address at the World Meetings of the Econometric Society, Barcelona, 1990 . 2 Grandmont cited the working paper versions 1997, published in 1998 in the Journal of Economic
Behavior & Organization and Macroeconomic Dynamics.
ing these ideas. Section 2 starts off from the concept of a consistent expectations equilibrium (CEE), as introduced in Hommes and Sorger (1998) , which may be seen as a formalization of Grandmont's idea of a self-fulfilling mistake. Along a selffulfilling mistake agents incorrectly believe that the economy follows a stochastic process, whereas the actual dynamics is generated by a deterministic chaotic process which is indistinguishable from the former (stochastic) process by linear statistical tests. The concept of CEE was motivated by the fact that piecewise linear asymmetric tent maps generate deterministic chaotic time series with exactly the same autocorrelations structure as a stochastic AR(1) process. Along a (chaotic) CEE agents use a simple linear, AR(1) forecasting rule and, given this belief, the economy follows a nonlinear chaotic asymmetric tent map dynamics with the same autocorrelation structure. Hommes and Sorger (1998) showed the existence of chaotic CEE in the cobweb "hog cycle" model with a backward bending supply curve. They also studied the stability of CEE under learning, introducing sample autocorrelation (SAC-)learning, where agents learn the two parameters of the AR(1) forecasting rule by the observed sample average and (first-order) sample autocorrelation coefficient.
Section 3 discusses an application of CEE in Hommes and Rosser (2001) , in a fishery model with backward bending supply. They simulated stochastic nonlinear models where agents learn to believe in chaos, that is, the system converges to a noisy chaotic system, with SAC-learning parameters converging to sample average and sample autocorrelations. This situation qualifies as a self-fulfilling mistake: agents can not reject the hypothesis that the economy follows and AR (1) In Section 5 we discuss recent work of Hommes and Zhu (2014) , who apply the idea of SCEE in a stochastic linear modeling framework. Grandmont (1985) . The final section concludes.
Consistent Expectations Equilibrium
Consider an expectations feedback system of the form
where p t is the state (or price) of the economy, p e t the forecast of the price in period t and F the actual law of motion of the economy. In general, the map F may be complex and nonlinear. A well known example of (1) is the classical cobweb "hog cycle" model, where F = D −1 S is the composition of inverse demand and supply curves.
Throughout this paper, we assume that agents are boundedly rational and do not know the law of motion F of the economy. Rather agents form a belief about the price generating process. Assume that all agents believe that prices are generated by equilibrium (REE) because it is to some extent consistent with Muth's original hypothesis of REE, while allowing for bounded rationality by restricting the class of the perceived law of motion.
a stochastic AR(1) process, that is, their perceived law of motion (PLM) is given by
where α and β ∈ [−1, 1] represent the long run mean and the first-order autocorrelations coefficient of the PLM, and δ t is an IID noise term. Given the PLM (2) and prices known up to p t−1 , the optimal forecast, that is, the prediction for p t minimizing the mean squared prediction error, is
Given that agents use the linear forecast (3), the implied actual law of motion becomes
The (observable) sample average of a time series (p t )
and the (observable) sample autocorrelation coefficients are given by
where
A consistent expectations equilibrium (CEE) is defined as (Hommes and Sorger, 1998)
is a sequence of prices and α and β are real numbers, β ∈ [−1, 1], is called a consistent expectations equilibrium (CEE) if 1. the sequence (p t ) ∞ t=0 satisfies the implied actual law of motion (4) and is bounded, 2. the sample averagep in (5) exists and is equal to α, and 4 More generally, for a (nonlinear) stochastic process Y the optimal forecast conditional on X minimizing the mean squared error is the conditional expectation E(Y |X); see e.g. Hamilton (1994) for a discussion and a proof. 3. the sample autocorrelation coefficients ρ j , j ≥ 1, in (6) exist and one of the following is true:
A CEE is a price sequence together with AR(1) belief parameters α and β, such that expectations are self-fulfilling in terms of the observable sample average and sample autocorrelations. The two parameters α and β of the AR(1) forecasting rule are not free, but pinned down by simple observable statistics. Along a CEE expectations are thus correct in a linear statistical sense. Hommes and Sorger (1998) showed that,
given an AR(1) belief, there are (at least) three different types of CEE:
• a steady state CEE in which the price sequence (p t ) ∞ t=0 converges to a steady state p * , with α = p * and β = 0;
• a 2-cycle CEE in which the price sequence (p t )
• a chaotic CEE in which the price sequence (p t ) ∞ t=0 is chaotic, with sample average α and autocorrelations β j .
A steady state CEE is a REE (at least in the long run) corresponding to some fixed point where demand D and supply S intersect. A 2-cycle CEE also is a REE, where the price jumps back and forth between two different intersection points of the demand and supply curves. A chaotic CEE is a non-rational equilibrium, where agents believe in a linear stochastic law of motion, while the true law of motion is nonlinear (e.g., a piecewise linear tent map) and chaotic. Which of these cases occurs in the cobweb model depends on the implied actual law of motion, i.e. upon the composite mapping
, determined by demand and supply curves. In general, different types of CEE may co-exist as will be discussed below.
Sample autocorrelation learning
The notion of CEE involves an AR(1) belief with fixed parameters α and β, which have been pinned down by two simple statistics, the sample average and the (first order) 
When, in each period, the belief parameters are updated according to (8) and (9) the (temporary) law of motion (4) becomes
One can also rewrite SAC-learning in recursive form. Define
then the SAC-learning is equivalent to the following recursive dynamical system (Hommes and Sorger, 1998) .
6 Although not identical, SAC-learning is closely related to the ordinary least squares (OLS-)learning scheme; see the discussion in Hommes and Sorger (1998) . A convenient feature of the SAC estimate β t in (9) is that it always lies in the interval [−1, 1], reflecting the fact that the firs order autocorrelation coefficient is not explosive, while the OLS-estimate may be outside this interval.
An important feature of CEE and SAC-learning is that both have a simple, intuitive behavioral interpretation. In a CEE agents use a linear forecasting rule with two parameters, the mean α and the first-order autocorrelation β. Which type of CEE exist in the nonlinear cobweb model and to which of them will the SAC-learning dynamics converge? Hommes and Sorger (1998) show that in the simplest case, when demand is decreasing and supply is increasing, the only CEE is the REE steady state price p * . This means that, even when the underlying market equilibrium equations are not known, agents will be able to learn and coordinate on the REE price if they learn the correct sample average and sample autocorrelations.
Hence, in a nonlinear cobweb economy with monotonic demand and supply, boundedly rational agents should, at least in theory, be able to learn the unique REE from time series observations 8 .
Hommes and Sorger (1998) study CEE in a cobweb model with linear demand and a non-monotonic, piecewise linear backward bending supply curve. They present examples of 2-cycle and chaotic CEE, where, given an AR(1) perceived law of motion, the implied actual law of motion is a chaotic piecewise linear tentmap. Different types of CEE, steady state, 2-cycle and chaotic, may co-exist and the SAC-learning dynamics exhibits path-dependence, with the long run CEE depending upon initial states.
In the long run however, the SAC-learning always settles down to one of the CEE, where agents have learned the correct sample average and sample autocorrelation. 7 In learning-to-forecast laboratory experiments for many subjects forecasting behavior is well described by simple rules, such as a simple AR (1) misspecification, and they learn the optimal misspecified forecasts. We also would like to stress the behavioural rationality interpretation of CEE and SAC-learning, because the simple AR(1) rule is intuitively plausible and SAC-learning may be seen as a learning heuristic through guestimating the sample average and first order sample autocorrelation. 9 The notion learning to believe in chaos has been introduced in Hommes (1998, p.360) , and the first examples have been given by Sorger (1998) and Hommes and Sorger (1998) . For related work on the instability of OLS learning, see e.g. Bullard (1994) and Grandmont (1998) . Schönhofer (1999) has used the notion of learning to believe in chaos in a somewhat different context, namely when the entire OLS-learning process fluctuates chaotically. In Schönhofers' examples belief parameters of the OLS-learning scheme do not converge, but keep fluctuating chaotically and at the same time, due to inflation, prices diverge to infinity, so that agents are in fact running an OLS-regression on a nonstationary time series. Tuinstra and Wagener (2007) consider the same model with heterogeneous expectations, with agents switching between different OLS-estimation methods.
We generalize the law of motion to a nonlinear stochastic system. SAC-learning is given by (8) , (9), as before, but we add a noise term to the implied actual law of motion, i.e.
where t is an independently identically distributed (IID) random process. Agents therefore do not make systematic mistakes, or at least there is no linear structure in their forecasting errors. As a next step, one could do statistical hypothesis testing of the linear forecasting rule. Would boundedly rational agents be able to reject their stochastic AR(1) belief or perceived law of motion by linear statistical hypothesis testing? Hommes and Rosser (2001) show that in this example the null hypothesis that prices follow a stochastic AR(1) process can not be rejected at the 10% level. Agents thus learn to believe in noisy chaos.
These equilibria are persistent with respect to dynamic noise. In fact, the presence of noise may increase the probability of convergence to such learning equilibria.
Agents are using a simple, but misspecified model to forecast an unknown, possibly complicated actual law of motion. Without noise, boundedly rational agents using time series analysis might be able to detect the misspecification and improve their forecast model. In the presence of dynamic noise however, misspecification becomes harder to detect and boundedly rational agents using linear statistical techniques can do no better than stick to their optimal, simple linear model of the world. This clearly satisfies Grandmont's earlier quote of a self-fulfilling mistake (Grandmont, 1998 , pp.776-777):
"One might envision situations in which agents do believe (wrongly) that the world is relatively simple (e.g. linear) but subject to random shocks, and in which the corresponding (deterministic) "learning equilibria" are complex enough to make the agents' forecasting mistakes "self-fulfilling" in a well defined sense. For instance, the agents might be assumed to have at their disposal a reasonably wide, but nevertheless limited, battery of statistical tests ("bounded rationality") which would not allow them to reject the hypothesis that their recurrent forecasting mistakes are attributable to random disturbances ..."
4 Stochastic Consistent Expectations Equilibrium (SCEE) Hommes et al. (2013) have generalized the notion of consistent expectations equilibrium to a stochastic setting. Let the law of motion of an economic system be given by the stochastic system
where x t is the state of the system at date t, x e t+1 is the expected value of x at date t+1, {u t } is an IID noise process with mean zero and f is a continuous (nonlinear) function.
Note that the timing is different and (13) has the form of a temporary equilibrium map, with the state x t depending on the expected future state x e t+1 . As before, agents are boundedly rational and do not know the exact form of the (nonlinear) law of motion (13) , but rather agents' perceived law of motion is a stochastic AR(1) process. Given this perceived law of motion, the 2-period ahead forecast x e t+1 that minimizes the mean-squared forecasting error is
Here we use the convention of the learning literature that x t in (13) is not yet observable when the forecast x e t+1 is made. Combining the forecast (14) and the law of motion of the economy (13), we obtain the implied actual law of motion (ALM) S1 The probability measure µ is a nondegenerate invariant measure for the stochastic difference equation (15); S2 The stationary stochastic process defined by (15) with the invariant measure µ
S3 The stationary stochastic process defined by (15) with the invariant measure µ has unconditional first-order autocorrelation coefficient β.
A first-order SCEE is thus characterized by two consistency requirements: the unconditional mean and the unconditional first-order autocorrelation coefficient generated by the actual (unknown) stochastic process (15) coincide with the corresponding statistics of the perceived linear AR(1) process. Along a SCEE the two parameters α and β of the AR(1) forecasting rule are thus not free, but pinned down by two simple observable statistics. This means that along a first-order SCEE agents correctly perceive the mean and the first-order autocorrelation (i.e., the persistence) of the stochastic state of the economy, without fully understanding its (nonlinear) structure.
Under SAC-learning the actual law of motion becomes
with time-varying parameters α t , β t as before in (8-9).
Hommes et al. (2013) study SAC-learning of SCEE in the highly nonlinear, chaotic overlapping generations model of Grandmont (1985) of the form
where g is a non-monotonic map with infinitely many periodic and chaotic equilibria.
An interesting finding is that SAC-learning always converges to a simple equilibrium, either a steady state or a 2-cycle, as illustrated in Figure 4 . In such a complex OLGeconomy, SAC-learning of an AR(1) rule thus leads to learning-to-believe-in a steady state or learning-to-believe in a two-cycle.
The nonlinear framework for SCEE is very general. A drawback of the nonlinear framework however is that computation of first-order autocorrelations is typically not analytical tractable. The next section presents a simpler linear framework for SCEE, where agents use a simple, but misspecified univariate AR(1) rule in a higher dimensional linear framework.
Behavioral Learning Equilibria
Hommes and Zhu (2014) apply the first order SCEE to a linear framework, in which the univariate AR(1) forecasting rule is misspecified. The simplest class of models arises when the actual law of motion of the economy is a one-dimensional linear stochastic process x t , driven by an exogenous AR(1) process y t . More precisely, the actual law of motion of the economy is given by
with parameters b 0 > 0, b 1 in the interval (−1, 1) 10 , b 2 > 0, a > 0 and 0 < ρ < 1; u t are IID shocks.
The rational expectations equilibrium x * t of (18-19) is a linear function of the driving variable y t , and is given by
Its unconditional mean and first-order autocorrelation are given by (Hommes and Figure 2 : Convergence of SAC-learning in the OLG-model of Grandmont (1985) . The model has infinitely many periodic and chaotic equilibria, but SAC-learning always selects a simple equilibrium outcome, either a steady state (top panels) or a 2-cycle (bottom panels). The plots show the price (P), expected price (EXPP), forecast error and the time-varying parameters α t and β t .
Zhu, 2014):
Note that in the special case σ u = 0, the above expression reduces to Corr(x * t , x * t−1 ) = ρ, that is, when there is no exogenous noise u t in (18) , the persistence of the REE coincides exactly with the persistence of the exogenous driving force y t . Hommes and Zhu (2014) show that for the linear system (18) (19) at least one nonzero first-order SCEE (α * , β * ) exists, with α * = x * and 0 < β < 1. They call this equilibrium a behavioral learning equilibrium (BLE), since it provides a simple, parsimonious forecasting rule, with the parameters pinned down by the simple statistics sample average and sample autocorrelation, on which a population of agents in large socio-economic systems may coordinate. Two important applications of this general framework are an asset pricing model driven by AR(1) dividends and a New Keynesian Phillips Curve (NKPC) where inflation is driven by an AR(1) process for marginal costs.
Asset pricing model
Consider an asset pricing model with a risky asset that pays stochastic dividends y t following an AR(1) process. The equilibrium price of the risky asset p t is given by
where R > 1 is the gross risk free rate of return. Compared to the general framework
and σ u = 0.
Using (20) , the rational expectations equilibrium p * t becomes
In particular, if {y t } is IID, i.e., a =ȳ and ρ = 0, then p *
The corresponding mean, variance and first-order autocorrelation coefficient of the rational expectation price p * t are given by, respectively,
Under the assumption that agents are boundedly rational and believe that the price p t follows a univariate AR(1) process, the implied actual law of motion for
A straightforward computation shows that the corresponding first-order autocorrelation coefficient F (β) of the ALM (28) is given by
Hommes and Zhu (2014) show that in the asset pricing model (28), the BLE (α * , β * ) is unique, α * =ȳ R−1 = p * and β * > ρ. This means that along the BLE the forecast is on average unbiased and prices exhibit persistence amplification, that is, the persistence β * is larger than the persistence ρ under RE. Furthermore, the BLE is stable under SAC-learning. is larger than that of fundamental prices. As illustrated in Figure 4b , the ratio of the variance of market prices and the variance of fundamental prices is greater than 1 for 0.4 < ρ < 1, with a peak around 3.5 for ρ = 0.7. For ρ = 0.9,
is, excess volatility by a factor of more than two for empirically relevant parameter values. first-order autocorrelation coefficient β * = 0.997. Figure 5c shows the asset price under SAC-learning, using the same sample path of noise, as the time series of the BLE in Figure 3c . Since the times series are almost the same, SAC-learning converges to the BLE rather quickly.
In summary, the BLE and SAC-learning offer an explanation of high persistence, excess volatility and bubbles and crashes in asset prices within a stationary time series framework.
A New Keynesian Philips curve
A second application of BLE and SAC-learning uses the New Keynesian macro model (Woodford, 2003) . In the New Keynesian Philips curve (NKPC) with inflation driven by an exogenous AR(1) process y t for the firm's real marginal cost or the output gap, inflation and the real marginal cost (output gap) evolve according to
where π t is the inflation at time t, π e t+1 is the subjective expected inflation at date t + 1, y t is the output gap or real marginal cost, δ ∈ [0, 1) is the representative agent's subjective time discount factor, γ > 0 is related to the degree of price stickiness in the economy and ρ ∈ [0, 1) describes the persistence of the AR(1) driving process. u t and ε t are IID stochastic disturbances with zero mean and finite absolute moments with variances σ 2 u and σ 2 ε , respectively. The most important difference with the asset pricing model is that (30) includes two stochastic disturbances, namely the shock ε t of the AR(1) driving variable and an additional noise term u t in the New Keynesian Philips curve. We refer to u t as a supply shock (or markup shock), and to ε t as a demand shock, that is uncorrelated with the supply shock. We will see that this extra shock allows for the possibility of multiple equilibria. Compared with our general framework (18) , the corresponding parameters are b 0 = 0, b 1 = δ and b 2 = γ.
Under the assumption that agents are boundedly rational and believe that inflation π t follows a univariate AR(1) process, the implied actual law of motion becomes
The corresponding first-order autocorrelation coefficient F (β) of the implied ALM (31) is computed as
Hommes and Zhu (2014) show that for 0 < ρ < 1 and 0 ≤ δ < 1, there exists at least one nonzero BLE (α * , β * ) for the New Keynesian Philips curve (31) with
For the New Keyensian Philips curve (31), multiple BLE may coexist. In the simulations below, we fix the parameters δ = 0.99, γ = 0.075, a = 0.0004, ρ = 0.9, (Figures 7a and 7b) , the SAC-learning dynamics (α t , β t ) converges to the stable low-persistence BLE (α * , β * 1 ) = (0.03, 0.3066). Figure 7b also illustrates that the convergence of the first-order autocorrelation coefficient β t to the low-persistence first-order autocorrelation coefficient β * 1 = 0.3066 is very slow. For a different initial state, (π 0 , y 0 ) = (0.1, 0.15), our numerical simulation shows that the sample mean α t still tends to α * = 0.03, but only slowly (see Figure 7c ), while β t tends to the high persistence BLE β * 3 ≈ 0.9961 12 (see Figure 7d ).
Numerous simulations (not shown) show that for initial values π 0 of inflation higher than the mean α * = 0.03, the SAC-learning β t generally enters the highpersistence region. In particular, a large shock to inflation may easily cause a jump of the SAC-learning process into the high-persistence region. 13 In the following we further indicate how high and low persistence BLE depend on different parameters.
Multiple equilibria and parameter dependence Figure 8 illustrates how the number of BLE depends on the parameter γ. For sufficiently small γ(< 0.05), there exists only one, low persistence BLE β * (Figure 8a ).
Moreover, since
the graph of F (β) in (32) shifts upward as γ increases. At some critical γ-value, a tangent bifurcation occurs. Immediately thereafter, there exist three BLE, β * 1 , β * 2 and β * 3 (see Figure 8b) . The low persistence BLE β * 1 and the high persistence BLE β * 3 are stable under SAC-learning, since 0 < F (β * j ) < 1, j = 1 and j = 3, separated by an unstable BLE β * 2 , with F (β * 2 ) > 1. As γ further increases, another tangent bifurcation occurs and the low persistence BLE disappears. A unique high persistence BLE then remains, which is stable under SAC-learning (Figure 8c ).
The dependence of the number of BLE and their persistence upon the parameter γ are quite intuitive. Recall that γ in (30) measures the relative strength of the 12 As shown in Figure 6a , F (β * 3 ) is close to 1 and, hence, the convergence of SAC-learning is slow. driving variable, the output gap or marginal costs, to inflation. When the driving force is relatively weak, a unique, stable low persistence BLE prevails, with much weaker autocorrelation than in the driving variable. At the other extreme, when the driving force is sufficiently strong, a unique, stable high persistence BLE prevails, with significantly stronger autocorrelation and higher persistence than in the driving variable. In the intermediate case, multiple BLE coexist and the system exhibits path dependence, where, depending on initial conditions, inflation converges to a low or a high persistence BLE.
In a similar way, the dependence of the BLE upon the noise ratio (32) can be rewritten as
Consequently, the effect of the noise ratio
is inversely related to the effect of γ.
Hence, when the ratio
is high, that is, when the markup shocks to inflation are high compared to the noise of the driving variable, a unique, stable low persistence BLE prevails. If on the other hand, the markup shocks to inflation are low compared to the noise of the driving variable, a unique, stable high persistence BLE prevails.
Furthermore, Figure 9 illustrates how the BLE β * , together with the first-order autocorrelation coefficient of REE inflation, depends upon the parameter ρ, measuring In summary, the dependence of the number of equilibria and whether the persistence is high or low are quite intuitive. This intuition essentially follows from the signs of the partial derivatives of the first-order autocorrelation coefficient F (β) in (32) of the implied ALM (31) satisfying:
Hence, as in Figure 8 , the graph of F (β) shifts upwards when γ increases,
ρ increases or δ increases, and consequently, the equilibria shift from low persistence to high persistence equilibria. When the nonlinearity is strong and F is S-shaped, e.g., as in Figure 6 for empirically relevant parameter values in the NKPC, both the persistence and the number of equilibria shift, and a transition from a unique stable low persistence BLE, through coexisting stable low and high persistence equilibria, to a unique stable high persistence equilibrium occurs. Such a transition from a unique low persistence BLE, through coexisting low and high persistence BLE, toward a unique high persistence BLE occurs when the strength of the AR(1) driving force (the parameter γ) increases, when the ratio of the model noise compared to the noise of the driving force (i.e. systems. Linear feedback maps (top panels), realized market prices (middle panels), six individual predictions (bottom panels) and individual errors (inside bottom panels). In the negative expectations feedback market (left panels) the realized price quickly converges to the RE benchmark 60. In all positive feedback markets (right panels) individuals coordinate on the "wrong" price forecast and as a result the realized market price persistently deviates from the RE benchmark 60.
of the near-unit-root positive feedback map, is that each point is in fact an almost self-fulfilling equilibrium. In near unit root positive feedback systems, agents only make small mistakes and these mistakes are almost self-fulfilling. Such near unit root behavior is typical in many macro and financial asset pricing models, where near unit roots arise e.g. due to discount factors close to 1. Will subjects in LtFEs be able to coordinate on the unique RE fundamental price, the only equilibrium that is perfectly self-fulfilling? Figure feedback system is of the form
where p t is the price of the consumption good, p e t+1 is the average price forecast of young consumers, G is a non-monotonic map and ρ 2 is a parameter (the degree of relative risk aversion of the old consumers). For small values of ρ 2 the dynamics of the map is simple, and the system has a stable steady state. For increasing values of ρ 2 the steady state becomes locally unstable and the dynamics exhibits a perioddoubling bifurcation route to chaos and generates infinitely many periodic and chaotic perfect foresight solutions. 
Concluding Remarks
I am grateful to Jean-Michel Grandmont for much of his inspiration over the years.
My work discussed here may be seen as formalizations of his ideas. In particular, the idea of self-fulfilling mistakes (Grandmont, 1998) , where agents (wrongly) believe that prices follow a (simple) stochastic process, while the true (unknown) law of motion is a nonlinear complex system, and agents are unable to statistically reject these beliefs, has inspired the research program on bounded rationality and learning. Coordination on almost self-fulfilling equilibria in positive feedback systems in laboratory experiments show the empirical relevance of these ideas. Much work on bounded rationality and learning in large socio-economic systems remains to be done, particularly to study how policy should manage self-fulfilling mistakes. 
